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ARTICLE
INTERNATIONAL LABOR RIGHTS
A CATEGORICAL IMPERATIVE?
par Kamil AHMED*
Les normes du travail constituent un sujet fort controversé en Droit international
économique, en particulier à cause de la dichotomie entre les pays développés et les pays en voie
de développement. Les premiers protègent les normes du travail de manière exhaustive, alors que
ces derniers ne partagent que rarement cette vision. Depuis sa création, l'Organisation
internationale du travail a substantiellement amélioré les normes et les droits fondamentaux du
travail. Malheureusement, elle n'est pas l'organisme idéal pour une application de ces
conventions, puisqu'elle n'est pas pourvue de mécanismes de mise en application de règles.
Jusqu'à ce jour, l'Organisation mondiale du commerce n’a pas non plus réussi à protéger les
droits fondamentaux du travail, et une entente complète entre les pays développés et les pays en
voie de développement demeure toujours incertaine, du moins à court ou moyen terme.
Cependant, depuis peu, nous assistons à la naissance d'une nouvelle forme de réglementation
dite souple : les Codes corporatifs de conduite. Grâce à eux, nous en sommes maintenant aux
premiers balbutiements d'une ère nouvelle, où les multinationales ont certaines obligations en
Droit international. L'avantage des Codes corporatifs qui retient l'attention est certainement leur
grande flexibilité : ils ont à la fois une portée transnationale et internationale et sont facilement
adaptables à leur contexte d'application. Le présent article expose comment l'action combinée
des conventions de l'Organisation internationale du travail, des règles de l'Organisation
mondiale de commerce et des Codes corporatifs de conduite peuvent améliorer la protection des
normes et droits fondamentaux du travail, dans un contexte où les mécanismes de mise en
application de règles font encore défaut.
Labor standards are a contentious issue in International Trade Law and particularly
reflect the dichotomy between developed and underdeveloped states. The first tend to protect
labor rights extensively and the latter rarely do so. Since its inception, the International Labor
Organization has significantly bettered the protection of labor rights, but this is not the best
forum to uniquely pursue given its lack of enforcement mechanisms. The World Trade
Organization until now has also failed to protect international labor rights and a comprehensive
agreement to this effect is improbable, at least in the short to mid-term. A new form of soft-
regulation has however developed : the Corporate Code of Conduct. Presently, we are at the
genesis of an era where multi-national corporations are beginning to possess obligations at
International Law. The advantage of Corporate Codes of Conduct is that they are flexible,
transnational and as international and adaptable as a corporation can be. This paper argues
that the combined application of International Labor Organization conventions, World Trade
Organization rules and Corporate Codes of Conduct can significantly improve the protection of
labor rights, despite a general lack of rule enforcement mechanisms.
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1. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (30 October 1947) 58 U.N.T.S. 187, Can. T.S.
1947 No. 27 (entered into force 1 January 1948).
2. «Trade Winds», online : The Economist (6 November 1997) <http://www.economist.com/
displayStory.cfm?Story_ID=105723> (date accessed : 25 February 2003).
3. «Fifty years on», online : The Economist (14 May 1998) <http://www.economist.com/
displayStory.cfm?Story_ID=128462> (date accessed : 25 February 2003) [hereinafter 50
years on].
4. Ibid.
INTRODUCTION
When the MTS was created in 1948, 23 pioneering countries cut one
another’s export tariffs under the GATT1. ITL was thereafter entrenched, yet the
MTS has since changed immensely. The world has become an interconnected
community at social, political, ideological and economic levels. This
phenomenon is often called globalization and unprecedented trade development
is its most visible sign2. States generally recognize the beneficial economic
impact derived from reduced trade barriers in its aggregate sum, which leads
them to accept setbacks in certain areas of their economies to allow others to
flourish. Autarky is therefore the exception and open economies the norm in
2004. 
ITL is in flux and experts agree that labor standards are a contentious
issue reflecting the dichotomy between MDCs and LDCs3. The first tend to
protect labor rights extensively. This substantially augments production costs
and diminishes their competitiveness against the latter. In fact, LDCs seek to
maintain their ability to export goods at low prices and poorly paid labor is
integral to this economic policy4. Unfortunately, poorly protected labor rights
lead to rampant abuses, which is why in certain circumstances, and justifiably
so, they have been characterized as IHRs. 
Three mechanisms working in tandem can better protect labor rights
than the status quo does : the ILO, WTO and CCCs. First, the ILO has advanced
the status of labor rights significantly since it was founded in 1919, but not
nearly enough. It must nonetheless continue to apply pressure in international
fora, complemented by other mechanisms. Second, WTO member-States have
been unable to conclude a substantive agreement whereby a minimum set of
labor entitlements are prescribed and duly enforced. Such an agreement must
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5. B. Hepple, «A Race to the Top? International Investment Guidelines and Corporate Codes
of Conduct» 20 : 345 Comp. Labor law & Pol’y Journal 347 at 350 [hereinafter Hepple #1].
6. M. Busse, «Do Labour Standards Affect Comparative Advantage? Evidence for Labour-
Intensice Goods» (November 2001), Center for International Economic Studies, online :
<http ://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/issues/laborpaper.html> (date accessed :  1 March
2003) at 6-7 [hereinafter Busse].
undoubtedly be the normative goal of IHRL, yet the Seattle conference and
subsequent events demonstrate practical difficulties. WTO rules could
nonetheless be modified to remedy this challenging reality upon the existence
of sufficient political will. Third, a private form of regulation has emerged; the
CCC. This code can better protect labor rights, until a substantive WTO
agreement is concluded. It is not a «cure» to the world’s labor right abuses, but
nonetheless has potential for beneficial impact. Even marginal improvements are
welcome, as a «step-by-step» approach often achieves more then an «all or
nothing» approach. In fact, gradual developments will likely lead to a more
comprehensive solution in the long-term, which is a possibility certainly worth
exploring. CCCs can make a material difference when properly drafted and even
more importantly, implemented5. We will be examining these closely, by
studying whether CCCs constitute a viable interim solution in theory and in
practice. Despite this, a substantive WTO agreement is what ITL must
ultimately strive for, coupled with ILO conventions and corporate cooperation.
The question is whether this is not only possible, but probable as well?
I. Definition and scope of «labor standards»
A universally acceptable definition of «labor standards» is next to
impossible because social, cultural, political, ideological and economic
differences often lead to irreconcilable constructions. Despite these differences,
it is generally accepted that a distinction between CLS and SLS is justified6.
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7. Ibid. at 6.
8. Charter of the United Nations, 26 June 1945, Can. T.S. 1945, No. 7.
9. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(III), UN GAOR, 3d Sess., Supp. No.
13, UN Doc. A/810 (1948) 71; A. Singh & A. Zammit, «The Global Labor Standards
Controversy : Critical Issues for Developing Countries» (October 2000), South Centre,
online : <http ://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/issues/laborpaper.html> (date accessed : 8
March 2003) at 2 [hereinafter Singh].
10. Singh, ibid. at 3.
11. Busse, supra note 6 at 7. These three UN treaties are : (1) The International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 16 December 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, Can. T.S. 1976
No.46 (entered into force 3 January 1976, accession by Canada 19 May 1976); (2) The
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 19 December 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
Can. T.S. 1976 No. 47, 6 I.L.M. 368  (entered into force 23 March 1976, accession by
Canada 19 May 1976); (3) The Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 November 1989,
1577 U.N.T.S. 3, Can. T.S. No. 3 (entered into force 2 September 1990, accession by
Canada, 13 December 1991).
12. J. Levinson, «Certifying International Workers Rights : A Practical Alternative» (June 1999),
Economic Policy Institute, online: <http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/issues/
laborpaper.html> (date accessed : 2 March 2003) at 4 [hereinafter Levinson]. Examples of
these are : «the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act (1974 as amended, particularly
Section 3.01); the General System of Preferences (GSP); and the Caribbean Basin Initiative
(CBI). The legislation governing the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, or OPIC,
A. Core labor standards
CLS inter alia refer to «… important human rights and include basic
union rights, freedom from forced labour, equal opportunity in employment, and
the abolition of child labour.»7 CLS are protected by IHRL, which includes
treaties such as the UN Charter8 and Universal Declaration of Human Rights9.
«Efforts to make adherence to core labour standards compulsory have become
more persistent as the impediments to international trade have been dismantled
and as capital markets have become increasingly liberalized …»10 Unfortunately,
IHRL has struggled and continues to struggle with the omnipresent issue of
legitimacy and in corollary, enforcement. CLS nonetheless receive quasi-
universal recognition. «This can be seen from the fact that more than 130
countries have ratified three United Nations acts on core labour standards»11.
Furthermore, the foreign policies of certain States, such as the US, have adopted
foreign policies making them reluctant to conclude trade and investment
agreements with States failing to respect CLS. The US has enacted legislation
to this effect because CLS are exogenous considerations having endogenous
consequences within its labor policy12. It is however quite possible that this
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contains similar worker rights provisions.»
13. V. A. Leary, «The Paradox of Workers’ Rights as Human Right» in P. Macklem, Class
materials of International Human Rights Law, v. 2. (Toronto, Fall 2002) 407 at 407
[hereinafter Leary].
14. This expression refers to States each lowering their labor standards in order to gain an
advantage over competing States that will also do the same, until labor rights receive no
protection at all. Economists believe that «a race all the way to the bottom is unlikely to
occur in fairly competitive markets even if countries are large enough to affect one another.»
D.K. Brown, «International Trade and Core Labor Standards : A Survey of Recent
Literature»  (January 2001) Tufts University, online : <http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/
issues/laborpaper.html> (date accessed :  5 March 2003) at 33 [hereinafter Brown #1]. For
such studies, see : R. A. Lawrence, Single World Divided Nations? International Trade and
OECD Labor Markets (Paris : OECD Development Centre, 1996); T.N. Srinivasan,
«International Trade and Labor Standards from an Economic Perspective» in P. van Dijck
and G. Faber, eds.,  Challenges in the New World Trade Organization (Amsterdam : Kluwer
Law International 1996) 219; A. Krueger, «Observations on International Labor Standards
and Trade», National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 5632 (1996).
15. Leary, supra note 13 at 407.
16. Singh, supra note 9 at 4.
legislation infringes ITL.
CLS have international significance partly because of today’s
unprecedented transnational economy. They can be analogized to the canary in
the coal-mine : «[t]he status of workers’ rights in a country are a bellwether for
the status of human rights in general»13. CLS speak to what is fundamentally
human and is directly related to dignity. The occupation of people is intimately
related to their individual identity, as there is something inherent of the nature
of human capacity to engage in productive capacity. Protection of CLS in
principle ensures against a race to the bottom14, as it limits and delineates the
decision-making of corporate actors. Leary in fact believes labor rights are
attached to social rights more broadly and operate to mitigate potentially adverse
consequences associated with greater economic integration.15 Labor rights can
also be seen as testing the justice of such integration and ensuring its just
development. 
B. Substantial labor standards
Certain rights are intimately associated with a person’s occupation, yet
are not part of IHRL16. In Canada and the US, Occupational Health and Safety
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17. Busse, supra note 6 at 7.
18. S. Cooney, «Testing Times for the ILO : Institutional Reform for the New International
Economy» 20 :347 Comp. Labor law & Pol’y Journal 365 at 373 [hereinafter Cooney].
19. A. Panagariya, «Trade-Labor Link : A Post-Seattle Analysis» (June 2000), University of
Maryland-College Park, online : <http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/issues/laborpaper.
html> (date accessed : 15 March 2003) at 7 [hereinafter Panagariya].
Acts often protect these labor rights, which are entitlements beyond the «core»
threshold and are meant to better safeguard the future and prosperity of workers.
«These other labour standards [also known as SLR], sometimes called
“acceptable conditions of work”, are highly controversial»17. Critics argue that
MDCs have the financial resources to protect SLR, where as LDCs do not. Some
believe that unequal resources demonstrate the de facto illegitimacy of the ILO,
among other organizations18. If these arguments were accepted, then
International Law in its entirety would be illegitimate as well, which is not yet
the case in 2004, notwithstanding common legitimacy concerns.
II. Comparative Advantage/Disadvantage?
Little consensus exists amongst critics whether better-protected labor
rights equate to a comparative advantage or disadvantage. Much of this debate
ultimately stems from the very definition of labor rights and more importantly,
the economic situations of States. Panagariya argues that  «[d]eep down, this is
essentially the age-old pauper labor argument that labor unions have repeatedly
used to seek protection for labor-intensive industries in developed countries»19.
A. The dichotomy between MDCs and LDCs
Generally speaking, MDCs protect CLS and SLS far better than LDCs,
which increases their variable costs, thus increasing total production costs.
LDCs protect labor standards quite poorly which accordingly enables them to
streamline variable costs. Fixed costs for LDCs are also reduced because labor
constitutes a substitute for certain types of capital expenditures. The savings in
variable and fixed costs make LDCs more competitive on price than MDCs.
Competitiveness is ultimately contingent on the price elasticity of demand,
whereby some industries are far more elastic than others. This said, competitive
prices help LDCs counter the better technology of MDCs, though a clear
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20. P. Epifani & G. A. Gancia, «The Skill Bias of World Trade» (March 2002), Institute for
International Economic Studies, online : <http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/issues/
laborpaper.html> (date accessed : 20 March 2002) at 2 [hereinafter Epifani & Gancia]; T.
Harcourt, «What About the Workers? Globalisation and Labour Markets» (2002), Australian
Trade Commission, online :  <http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/issues/laborpaper.html>
(date accessed : 18 March 2003) at 1.
21. Epifani & Gancia, ibid. at 2.
22. Busse, supra note 6 at 13 [footnote omitted].
23. Other relevant inputs are the quantity of labor, physical capital, natural resources and
technological knowledge. See N. G. Mankiw et al., Principles of Macroeconomics, Brief 2nd
Canadian ed. (Toronto : Nelson, 2002) at 133-136.
24. Ibid. at 134.
imbalance is nonetheless apparent in favor of the latter. Developed States
therefore want their underdeveloped counterparts to protect labor rights more
extensively, which would make the former lose their competitive advantage.
Such calls for the increased protection of labor rights superficially appear as
«humane», but manifestly undermine the ability of LDCs to compete globally
given their lack of technology and inadequate resources generally20. Not
surprisingly, wage inequality between developing and developed countries has
been steadily increasing over the past twenty years21. This wage divide will
continue to exist until LDCs protect labor rights more extensively than they
presently do.
IHRs have immense economic value, though not intrinsically so. For
example, CLS proscribe child labor, yet this type of labor is inexpensive and
substantially facilitates the streamlining of costs in the immediate future. «Since
the employment of children accounts for over ten per cent of the workforce in
some developing countries, the quantitative effect of child labour can be quite
substantial»22. Unfortunately, most LDCs fail to consider the long-term
detrimental economic consequences of child labor and its effect on the GDP.
Human capital is in fact central to the productivity function in
macroeconomics23. «Although education, training, and experience are less
tangible than lathes, bulldozers, and buildings, human capital is like physical
capital in many ways. Like physical capital, human capital raises a nation’s
ability to produce goods and services»24. A lack of education in society
indisputably leads to a poorly skilled workforce having reduced productivity,
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25. Busse, supra note 6 at 13.
26. For a discussion of dependency theory, see generally : C. Furtado, Development and
Underdevelopment (Berkeley : University of California Press, 1964); I. Wallerstein, The
Modern World System : Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World
Economy in the Sixteenth Century (New York : Academic Press, 1976); A.G. Frank,
Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America (New York : Monthly Review Press,
1967); L.A. Travis, ed., Rekindling Development : Multinational Firms and World Debt
(South Bend, IN : University of Notre Dame Press, 1989); C. Colclough & J. Manor, eds.,
States or Markets? Neo-Liberalism and the Development Policy Debate (New York : Oxford
University Press, 1991); S. Haggard, Pathways from the Periphery : The Politics of Growth
in the Newly Industrialized Countries (Ithaca : Cornell University Press, 1990).
27. D.S. Papp, Contemporary International Relations, 5th ed. (Boston : Allyn and Bacon, 1997)
at 482-83 [hereinafter Papp].
28. Ibid. at 483.
29. For a discussion of modernization theory, see generally : A.Y. So, Social Change and
Development  : Modernization, Dependency and World-System Theories (Newbury Park,
CA : Sage Publications, 1990); J. Langer, Theories of Development (New York : Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1969); M.O. Attir, B. Holzner & Z. Suda, eds, Modernization Theory,
Research, and Realities (Boulder : Westview, 1981); B.L. Billet, Modernization Theory and
Economic Development : Discontent in the Developing World (Westport, CO : Praeger,
1993).
and their progeny will likely face similar dire circumstances25.
Furthermore, dependency theory is an analytical framework well used
in international relations26. Dependency theorists argue that MDCs developed
as a result of inexpensive labor and raw materials from LDCs, and would in fact
argue that such exploitation continues on two fronts which are very relevant to
our discussion. «The first is within individual businesses, where owners exploit
and profit from the labor of their workers. In many respects, this level of analysis
is similar and in some cases identical to Marxist interpretations»27. The second
is that exploitation occurred and continues between developed and developing
States28. This debate is important to keep in mind, as is its counterargument;
modernization theory29. Economic studies of whether LDCs are at a comparative
disadvantage to MDCs will now be analyzed.
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30. Brown #1, supra note 14 at 28.
31. C. Van Beers, «Labour Standards and Trade Flows of OECD Countries» (1998) 21 : 1 World
Economy 57.
32. Busse, supra note 6 at 9.
33. Ibid.; Brown #1, supra note 14 at 26.
34. J.S. Mah, «Core Labour Standards and Export Performance in Developing Countries» (1997)
20 : 6 World Economy 773; Brown #1, supra note 14.
35. Busse, supra note 6 at 9; Brown #1, supra note 14.
36. Busse , supra note 6 at 14.
B. Economic Studies
Any study of comparative advantage must be taken lightly as there is «…
little consistent evidence [and interpretations deriving therefrom] concerning the
impact of labor standards and civil liberties on economic performance»30.
Economists are split on this issue which results from the use of differing
analytical models. Indeed, externalities such as technology and consumer
preferences require economic analysis, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
Van Beers conducted a study where the relationship between exports and
CLS of 18 OECD States was analyzed31. «… [H]e used a combined index of
standards that includes employment protection rights, fixed term contracts,
working time, minimum wages, and employees’ representation rights»32. Van
Beers concluded that stricter labor standards equate to decreased exports of
capital and labor-intensive goods of skilled labor. It is therefore financially
expedient, says Van Beers, for underdeveloped States to not protect labor
rights33.
Mah conducted a study where exports, labor standards and ILO
convention ratifications by 45 LDCs were compared and contrasted34. The
freedom of association, protection against discrimination in the workplace, right
to collective bargaining and abolition of forced labor was included in his list of
labor rights. Like Van Beers, Mah concluded that a negative relationship exists
between exports and higher labor standards35. The foregoing studies concluded
that LDCs have a comparative advantage primarily for unskilled labor-intensive
goods36. In corollary, MDCs are comparatively disadvantaged, though other
factors tend to balance this out.
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37. Ibid. at 5.
38. S. Charnovitz, «The Influence of International Labour Standards on the World Trading
Regime : A Historical Overview» (1987) 126 : 5 Int’l. Labour R. 565 at 569-70; Ibid. at 5.
39. Busse, supra note 6 at 5.
40. Levinson, supra note 12 at 3.
41. D. K. Brown, «International Labor Standards in the World Trade Organization and the
International Labor Organization» (December 1999), Tufts University, online :
<http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/issues/laborpaper.html> (date accessed : 18 March
2003) at 3 [hereinafter Brown #2].
42. Ibid. at 3.
III. Recent developments
The academic debate of labor rights in an ITL context is not a new
phenomenon. «In 1890, for example, the United States banned the entry of
foreign goods manufactured by convict labour»37. Similarly, the British
government in 1897 banned goods produced from «… any foreign prison, gaol,
house of correction or penitentiary»38. These concerns have come to the fore far
more recently, specifically during the Uruguay Round of GATT where France
and the US initiated discussions on it, to no avail. Similar results arose from the
WTO conferences held in Singapore and Seattle in 1996 and 1999 respectively39.
A. Singapore Conference
At the first Ministerial meeting of this conference in December 199640,
«… the Clinton Administration claimed that its objective with regard to labor
standards was only to signal U.S. workers that competition from low-wage
countries would not be intensified due to the denial of basic human rights»41. It
did not officially advocate the use of trade sanctions to punish States failing to
comply with CLS, but rather attempted to demonstrate the compatibility of these
rights with WTO rules42. American objectives were not met.
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43. Ibid.
44. Busse, supra note 6 at 5.
45. Ibid.
46. Leary, supra note 13 at 408.
47. Ibid.
48. J. Murray, «Corporate Code of Conduct and Labour Standards» in R. Kyloh, ed., Mastering
the Challenge of Globalization  (1998); Cooney, supra note 18 at 376.
B. Seattle Conference
The «official» American position changed immensely between the
Singapore and Seattle conferences. On the one hand, it attempted to establish a
relationship between the WTO and ILO. On the other hand and more
importantly, the US asserted that it would seek trade sanctions against any State
transgressing CLS43. The first was far easier to establish than the latter, which
the LDCs rejected.
 
The Clinton administration pushed its ILRs agenda at the Singapore and
Seattle conferences. However, the Bush (II) administration has not continued
this foreign policy and America is no longer leading the charge to firmly
entrench labor rights in the WTO44. Having now assumed this leadership role,
the EU proposed the issue at the 2001 Doha conference. LDCs discarded this
proposal on the basis «… that rich nations will seek to justify protectionist
measures against foreign competition by alleging their rivals abuse [of] workers'
rights»45.
IV. Protection Mechanism of ILRs
A. Labor Standards in the ILO
Since 1919, the ILO has in principle protected ILRs against a race to the
bottom by advocating against corporate competition on the basis of labor46.
Leary believes the ILO has been far more effective «… in comparison with the
work of the UN Human Rights Commission»47. Unfortunately, the ILO has
insufficient enforcement mechanisms and legitimacy issues to aptly protect ILRs
by itself48.
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53. World Trade Organization, «Trade and Labour Standards Subject of Intense Debate», online:
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i. Structural issues
The ILO has a tripartite structure. States, employer and employee
representatives are involved in the production of labor right norms49. This
participatory dimension is different from other NGOs and some authors in fact
argue the ILO is at the forefront of demonstrating that international actors other
than States are also relevant in International Law. Though this may be true,
developing States are pressuring to divide monitoring mechanisms of ILRs
between the ILO and WTO, which significantly dilutes the ability of either entity
to make any material difference. «Therefore, it is unlikely that the allocation of
the labor monitoring task to the ILO…»50 has improved overall enforcement of
ILRs, or that it can do so in the foreseeable future without substantially
revamping its structure.
ii. Steps taken by the ILO to protect ILRs in a nutshell
The ILO protects CLS and SLS in primarily 8 conventions51. These are
controversial, as is the ILO’s very raison d’être. «Even though there is
widespread agreement on the principles of these conventions, only 63 countries
have ratified all eight,»52 while States not having ratified these conventions
pledged their «best effort» to promote ILRs53. We clearly see that SLS are
particularly difficult to enforce, as they are not desired by most if not all LDCs54.
The ILO has nonetheless made invaluable contributions to workers’ rights
throughout the world since 191955. Something is ultimately better than nothing,
but the ILO simply cannot have the effect a substantive WTO agreement with
trade sanctions could have, unless its structure is dramatically revamped. This
said, the ILO probably has the strongest enforcement mechanisms of all IGOs
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57. WTO#1, supra note 53. «These conventions are the fundamental workplace rights including :
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and cannot be easily discarded56.
The ILO has taken two noteworthy steps since the 1996 Singapore
conference towards protecting ILRs in ITL. First, it adopted the Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its follow-ups in 1998. «Under
this declaration, ILO member governments endorsed some basic principles [also
known as CLS] which are included in the core ILO Conventions»57. Hepper
describes this as the most significant development towards the push to CCCs,
which will be examined later58. Second, the ILO banned the most severe forms
of child labor in 1999, which is defined as «…  all forms of slavery, child
prostitution and pornography, the use of children to traffic in drugs and work
which is likely to harm the health, safety or morals of children»59. At the WTO
ministerial Conference in 1996, Ministers asserted  :
We renew our commitment to the observance of internationally
recognized core labour standards. The International Labour Organization (ILO)
is the competent body to set and deal with these standards, and we affirm our
support for its work in promoting them. We believe that economic growth and
development fostered by increased trade and further trade liberalization
contribute to the promotion of these standards. We reject the use of labour
standards for protectionist purposes, and agree that the comparative advantage
of countries, particularly low-wage developing countries, must in no way be put
into question. In this regard, we note that the WTO and ILO Secretariats will
continue their existing collaboration60.
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iii. Criticism
Cooney argues that the ILO is a tired organization lacking legitimacy61.
He believes it archaic because the nature of the global economy has changed; yet
its model of regulation founded on industrial capitalism has not62. He argues that
it is well adapted to address the production of goods in assembly lines where
competing interests are clearly identifiable, but is unfit to address the flexible
and transnational nature of today’s economy and its largest actor, the MNC.
Massive increases in women in the workforce, part-time informal work and
transnational corporations abandoning traditional assembly line production
challenge the ILO’s very existence63.
Cooney contends that the ILO is poorly structured and is replete with
representational deficits. The organization is tilted in favor of the north and has
real trouble in giving representational space to the LDCs. Moreover, it has a
plethora of compliance concerns64, but to be fair to the ILO, these concerns
apply to every IHRs body. «Neither the ILO nor any other international body,
with the exception of the UN Security Council, has enforcement powers in the
sense that one may speak of enforcement in a national legal system»65.
The US has never seen the ILO as an entity in which it can pursue its
objectives. «Indeed, the United States withdrew from the ILO on three separate
occasions : 1919-34,1938-44 and 1977- 80»66. Certain authors argue that the US’
threat to withdraw from the ILO and to shift labor standards to the WTO forces
the organization to adopt labor policies in its favor67. These pressure tactics have
translated to some success, such as the Declaration on Fundamental Principles
and Rights at Work68 which goes so far as to obligate «… members who have
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not ratified the relevant conventions»69 to respect CLS. Again, these
developments must be distinguished from a positive and normative approach as
few effective enforcement mechanisms exist.
The US has extensive influence in both the ILO and WTO, despite that
this has translated to the better «theoretical» protection of ILRs. LDCs often
question the ILO’s political legitimacy because it is seen as the US’ alter ego.
This is particularly thorny because «[m]eaningful labor standards … must be
flexible and responsive to individual country conditions»70. Bhagwati argues that
the American position on ILRs is unsustainable. First, the US’ record is not scot-
free. «Bhagwati cites the brutal treatment of migrant labor, inadequate and
corrupt enforcement of U.S. labor law, wearing apparel sweatshops that employ
female immigrant labor for low wages and long hours and the air traffic
controller union-busting by the Reagan Administration»71. Second, the
protection of labor rights should not be achieved via threats and coercion72.
Despite the foregoing failures and criticisms, the international
community has for the most part agreed that ILRs are within the ILO’s expertise
which is founded on «… the social dimension of globalisation»73. Given this
reality, CLS and SLS will likely continue to be on the agenda of certain MDCs
for some time. The ILO has advanced ILRs significantly and must continue its
work with assistance from the WTO and CCCs. In fact, «developing countries
who ratify ILO conventions with regard to worker rights are more similar to
their trade partners in terms of the characteristics that determine trade than are
developing countries that do not ratify ILO conventions»74.
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B. International Economic Law
The WTO enables the study of the intersection between ILRs and IEL.
Until now, the WTO has not protected ILRs, as was previously discussed in the
brief historical overview. The issue is whether IEL can adequately protect ILRs
in its formulation of trade liberalization initiatives? Some authors believe that
«… a realization increasingly shared throughout the world that the world
economy, and world institutions, can be a better guarantee of rights and of
prosperity than some governments»75.
The IMF’s position is its power to evaluate a State’s protection of ILRs
when formulating monetary policies and loans to countries76. Labor rights
proponents argue that the WTO should have agreed in Seattle to amend its rules
requiring States to respect CLS, or face trade sanctions. Substantial debate exists
whether trade sanctions would better protect labor rights, as many States indeed
have enacted legislation in this regard. Effective implementation is rather the
issue requiring redress. In most countries, «there are also laws against child
labor but their enforcement remains beyond the means and ability of the
government. It is unlikely that trade sanctions can significantly change this
reality»77. The idea of trade sanctions suffered significant setback in Seattle, yet
other possibilities exist. WTO rules do not require modification per se, but
GATT 199478 and other ITL agreements can be read and constructed in light of
CLS. This must not however be viewed as a disguised form of protectionism,
which would render any such agreement ab initio nugatory. The current WTO
framework will now be discussed. 
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C. Why the current WTO framework fails to protect CLS 
GATT 1994 must be modified to entrench market barriers restricting
access to States failing to comply with CLS. There are no such prospects in the
short-term, and unfortunately in the longer term as well. We will now discuss
certain GATT 1994 provisions from a positive and normative perspective. 
i. Anti-dumping
Article VI of GATT 1994 states that exports are subject to anti-dumping
duties where goods are exported at sub-regular prices and the domestic
consumers of an importing State suffer material injury. «It has been argued that
selling products produced under sub-par working conditions constitutes social
dumping»79. Anti-dumping measures can only be applied in two situations,
which are currently deemed unrelated to CLS. First, where there is price
discrimination and the retail price of goods are higher in one State than in
another. Second, where goods are sold below their production costs80. Labor
rights and anti-dumping duties can co-exist, but not as a matter of cause and
effect but rather as the former being an indirect consequence of the latter81.
ii. Countervailing duties
Certain experts argue that CLS violations amounting to export subsidies
should be subject to countervailing duties when an importing State suffers
material injury. Article XVI of GATT 1994 would however require amendment
were this contention accepted, as breaching CLS is currently not tantamount to
such subsidizing82. Countervailing duties can only be applied where
governments or public entities provide subsidies in «the form of … financial
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contribution[s]… [amounting to] an income support or a price support»83 made
to specific corporations and not to a country in general. «Therefore, poor labor
standards that exist country-wide could not be considered specific to a subset of
firms»84. 
iii. General Exception Provisions
GATT Article XX lists certain free trade exemptions, of which CLS are
excluded. Their inclusion was in fact rejected during the Havana Charter’s
negotiations85. Brown and Maskus argue that «… trade barriers are almost never
the optimal intervention where labor standards are concerned and frequently
have adverse consequences»86. Article XX could arguably be amended to
include minimal labor standards as a free trade exemption.
iv. Nullification and Impairment Provisions
Article XXIII of GATT affirms that member-States can apply for dispute
resolution when other members engage in activities nullifying GATT obligations
or materially impairing them87. CLS are not within the ambit of this provision
however, though they should be. An American attempt to do so was in fact
specifically rejected in 195388.
v. Opt-out Provisions
GATT provides for opt-out provisions at Article XXXV, where WTO
members can refuse to extend certain privileges to incoming members for
whatever reason, including the failure to respect CLS, or even SLS89. As of
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February 5, 2003, the WTO had 145 members and the number of States that will
eventually join is quite limited for opt-out provisions to have any significant
effect in the large scheme of things90. China’s accession to WTO membership
would have been an opportune moment to use this clause, given its history of
rampant CLS violations91. A substantive WTO agreement must exceptionally
make opt-out provisions retroactive with regard to CLS uniquely. Article XXXV
could not receive general retroactive application because of the obvious chaos
and disagreement ensuing therefrom. 
vi. Trade Policy Review Mechanism
Labor rights can in principle be discussed during «… deliberations on
export zones in the framework of the …»92 TPRM. Similarly to opt-out
provisions, TPRMs cannot receive retroactive application that effectively
preclude the protection of ILRs. Moreover, LDCs are against discussing labor
rights in this context93. They rather argue that better labor standards arise from
economic prosperity. «They say that if the issue of» CLS «became enforceable
under WTO rules, any sanctions imposed against countries with lower labour
standards would merely perpetuate poverty and delay improvements in
workplace standards»94. LDCs may very well have a point on this, as anything
imposed from the top-down is difficult to maintain, as opposed to grassroots
developments being generally more stable. CLS discussions could of course take
part in TPRMs if LDCs so agreed.   
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vii. WTO Structure
«… [T]he WTO is … a multi-task agency controlled by multiple
principals»95. Its primary role is to monitor the compliance of members with
ITL. It is not particularly keen to address contentious issues the likes of ILRs
because of imminent conflict between member-States which ultimately damages
its all-important legitimacy. «The agency may have reservations concerning the
enforcement of labor standards because they are not obviously related to the
original mission of fostering free international trade»96. Nonetheless, they are
tangentially related and require address. Unlike NAFTA97, GATT 1994 currently
has no mechanism for handling investor complaints, as only States can institute
legal action. Similarly, the WTO can only authorize the imposition of trade
sanctions on States. It is currently antithetical to ITL for corporations themselves
to face trade sanctions. Imposing trade sanctions on States who them sanction
corporations is an extremely complicated endeavor, given that MNCs have
global operations98. Apportioning State liability would be ridiculous because of
the intrinsic complexity of this process.
From the foregoing, we see that current GATT rules do not allow for the
substantive protection of ILRs. Nonetheless, a WTO agreement would comprise
the following general guidelines (other than those already mentioned) in the
improbable eventuality that current circumstances fundamentally changed and
an agreement was concluded.
D. General Guidelines for a potential WTO agreement
Like all ITL agreements, it would be a highly complex process for the
WTO to substantively protect labor rights. Nonetheless, Brown argues that :
There is no reason in principle why the culture of the WTO could not set
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different standards and enforcement mechanisms for trade and labor standards.
The problem, however, is that the United States, in particular, cannot credibly
pre-commit not to try to interpret poor labor practices in terms of the trade
discipline equivalent. If the United States were to succeed, the harsh and rigid
rules governing international trade would be applied inappropriately to labor
standards99.
It is imperative for any agreement to not be viewed as a market barrier
tantamount to protectionism and in breach of ITL. Any measure protecting CLS
must therefore use the least restrictive means, which revolves around
proportionality. Similarly, the enacting State must treat those adversely affected
by its measures equally, all the while considering real differences and modifying
its trade policy accordingly. Differences would be adjudicated in a process
founded on procedural fairness and natural justice.
A link can be made between the WTO and CCCs. A procedure could
exist whereby States are deemed innocent until corporations are proven in
violation of their CCCs. This ensures uniformity, all the while having some form
of targeted soft-regulation. Presumably, a semi-public procedure enabling NGOs
and investors to make allegations would exist, leading to a hearing and decision
upon demonstration of probable cause. Before a decision is rendered, an
opportunity for a corporation to negotiate an effective remedy is necessary.
Moreover, a State could not unilaterally impose a market barrier. It would rather
have the duty to negotiate with States detrimentally affected by its measures. A
transition period would be necessary such that those affected have sufficient
time to adjust their labor infringing trade practices. Similarly, a State imposing
CLS for the production of certain goods must offer technical assistance to
facilitate compliance.
Under current WTO rules, intrinsically alike products fabricated
differently cannot receive dissimilar treatment. To do otherwise, so the rules
hold, constitutes protectionism. An argument can be made where no deviation
from CLS is tolerated, as these constitute baseline production costs that cannot
be streamlined. More importantly, this distinction would not be subject to anti-
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dumping duties. This was the issue in the Tuna case100, where a distinction was
drawn between the product itself and its production process. Unfortunately, the
WTO appellate body rejected this argument and makes no distinction between
products fabricated by free and slave labor, which is inherently disturbing from
a normative perspective. Had this argument been accepted, CLS protection
would have been significantly transformed. The WTO appellate body makes a
fragile distinction in several ways and scholarship is questioning it. «Would
have» is clearly the key term in Tuna. A potential WTO agreement should adopt
the position rejected by the WTO appellate body.
The WTO appellate body rejected another interesting argument in the
Shrimp Turtles case101; it was argued that a member-State could discriminate
against another State’s products based on its regulatory framework. US law
conditioned market access for shrimp from certain jurisdictions, where shrimp
fishermen could sue corporations producing technology trapping sea turtles in
nets. Such regulation was held inconsistent with GATT obligations. The
decision spells out circumstances where a State could make such regulatory
distinctions, which represents the politicization of labor rights and trade
agreements. From a legal perspective, these issues are quite open and are not as
closed as the debate in Seattle depicted. This is particularly so because stare
decisis does not apply in ITL. The WTO dispute settlement body could easily
adjudicate the same issues raised by Tuna and Shrimp Turtles differently, in
support of CLS. In fact, «… WTO law continues the evolution toward a process
governed by rules driven by real treaty obligations»102.
These general guidelines require member-States to enact domestic
legislation that conditions market access on the respect of CLS. Within this same
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conception, we can also imagine a framework where domestic law obliges
MNCs producing or selling goods respectively within or from a particular State
to meet WTO standards. This is quite relevant in the context of CCCs. This
proposal, which is quite similar to Shrimp Turtles, is where the future of the
trade labor debate is going. The CCC will now be analyzed.
E. The Corporate Code of Conduct
Presently, we are at the genesis of an era where MNCs are beginning to
possess obligations at International Law. They comprise some of the world’s
largest economies and in corollary, have the proportionate influence
accompanying this103. The regulation of MNCs therefore has potential to
ameliorate CLS. CCCs are forms of private regulation adhered to by
corporations throughout their worldwide operations. Their emergence is due to
several reasons104. First, they «… are a response to public pressure from
consumers, investors, trade unions, and NGOs»105. Being intrinsically
transnational in nature, CCCs flexibly follow and regulate corporations wherever
they produce goods. Their emergence demonstrates the privatization of
regulation, where there is a «… retreat from public international labor law,
embodied above all in the Convention and Recommendations of the ILO …»106
Second, many managers believe better labor standards are actually
profitable, despite that they seem prima facie more expensive. Benefits include
increased employee morale, fewer accidents and sick leave, lower employee
turnovers and better product quality107. It is well known in organizational
behavior that happy workers are more efficient workers. Examples such as the
Hawthorne Studies indicate improved employee performance with increased
management presence and support108. Increased employee productivity can
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augment consumer confidence in a company and its products, which
consequently increases sales109. Of course, everything is a question of degree. At
some point, better working conditions become unprofitable.
Third, CCCs «… can be used to strengthen the power of central
management»110. This enables corporate headquarters to dictate to
subcontractors which labor standards must be peremptorily respected and is part
of the «… monitoring process which leads to better product quality»111. Such
increased power benefits contractors by standardizing practices, as it protects
against a race to the bottom that creates unfair competition and violates CLS112.
Fourth, the Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work
is a voluntary document having follow-up procedures, but without sanctions113.
Signatory States recognize the implementation difficulties and recognize at
paragraph five that : «[L]abour standards should not be used for protectionist
purposes, and that nothing in this Declaration and its follow-up shall be invoked
or otherwise used for such purposes; in addition the comparative advantage of
any country should in no way be called into question by the Declaration and its
follow-up.»
Fifth, the emergence of CCCs demonstrates the failure of the public
realm. They surfaced as a result of a historical process of privatization that arose
from the success of capitalism. The traditional domestic rationale was the
distrust States had of self-regulating corporations, which eventually led to State
responses. The question is whether privatizing regulation will bring us back to
where we started, which is akin to the «fox in the henhouse» analogy. This issue
can however be addressed when CCCs, domestic legislation, international
standards, ILO conventions and hopefully eventual WTO labor standards
complement one another. This paper does not argue that CCCs should or can
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exist unaccompanied. Conventions and domestic legislation are clearly useful
from a normative and hopefully positive approach114. «In some cases employers
actually prefer to have standards imposed because they constrain the behavior
of some of their less scrupulous competitors.  In other cases, firms use domestic
standards in their foreign operations to avoid the critique that they are shopping
for low standard locations …»115 There have been several failed attempts to
create effective regimes that protect ILRs under traditional mechanisms. The
MAI, for example, has proved futile116. CCs are fairly recent phenomena and
«[r]esearch into the rapidly proliferating number of private corporate codes is
[currently] in its infancy»117. The ILO has determined the existence of 12 social
labeling programs and 215 CCCs118, the U.K. Department For International
Development found 18 U.K. CCCs119, and the OECD ascertained the existence
of 182 codes120. 
i. Transnational flexibility
It is trite law that States can uniquely regulate corporate activities within
the confines of their borders. The fact nonetheless remains that domestic
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legislation generally lacks the extra-territorial reach which explains its
ineffectiveness in a global economy121. Contrarily, CCCs do not «stop at the
border,» so to speak. Robert Bork once observed that certain corporations are
so powerful that they «… could ignore American laws, sometimes with
impunity»122. Corporate practices are extremely complex nowadays, and
regulation must adapt to this reality123. Generally speaking, «[l]abor practices in
foreign plants are broadly similar to their domestic labor standards»124. This
partly explains why a well-drafted CCC, supplemented by other regulatory
instruments, is useful.
ii. The Ideology of Corporatism
Corporatism as an ideology cannot be ignored. First, numerous States
have lax labor standards to lure foreign investment. Second, certain States have
prima facie stringent and effective rules, which are ignored to promote the
investment of MNCs125. «Because of their size, MNCs wield impressive
economic, political, and social power. It does not matter whether that power is
sought or unsought … it exists ... In an economic sense, multinational
corporations can make or break a local economy, and in the cases of smaller
States, even a national economy»126. One initiative that has attempted to
counteract these realities is the NAALC. This has been more of a political tool
than a looming sanction and has had modest results. It has raised «… public
awareness and political cooperation, strengthening cooperation between labor
rights advocates»127.
Corporatism is replete with repercussions for ILRs. It is premised on
David Ricardo’s law of comparative advantage. In its simplest form, the law
asserts that it is advisable for States to specialize in the production of goods
where they are most competitive. States thereafter trade for goods where they
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are uncompetitive128. This optimizes overall production and market efficiency
by preserving valuable resources. Minimizing costs, which maximizes
profitability is obviously integral to the financial objectives of MNCs. They have
the ability of massive inter-jurisdictional movement and have become especially
successful by moving to low-labor-cost areas129. Many States, such as Singapore
and Taiwan have had immense economic growth because MNCs have taken
advantage of their low labor-costs130.
iii. Regulatory precision
CCCs can potentially identify with surgical precision what institutions
the likes of the ILO cannot. The CCC is a hyper-delineated regulatory
instrument specific to a particular corporation.131 General regulation meant to
encompass all MNCs is less effective because it fails to regulate the specificities
of particular industries, number of employees, infrastructures, business
organizations, corporate culture, and so forth. The ILO, for example, creates
rules to encompass CLS and SLS at a very abstract level throughout the world,
which is why it can never, in principle, rival a well-drafted CCC. 
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iv. Consumer attention
CCCs provide incentives for corporations to compete for consumer
attention, which is certainly one of its most noteworthy advantages. They
involve an element of marketing and branding, such that corporations compete
for the better code to receive consumer allegiance132. This competition is not
necessarily applicable in all cases, though its theoretical rationale is significant.
«A race to the top» can occur as consumers are more attuned to the type of code
being used, in addition to the type of values it enforces133. Corporations seek to
create the most visibility for their CCCs and practices ensuing therefrom.
Business practices will never be as important as products themselves, but may
nevertheless be representative in the long-term of what a corporation stands for,
and even more important, what it should stand for. For example,
environmentally conscious investors having the choice are more likely to invest
in environmentally friendly products than not. Corporations are obviously open
to move in new directions to satisfy their consumer bases, which, to expound the
obvious, constitutes their market power. CCCs may very well be determinative
for certain consumers, resulting in significant sales in their aggregate sum. They
are also vital in light of increasingly homogenized consumer tastes because
many goods have similar production mechanisms134. Better practices in one area
can therefore improve an entire industry’s production methods, thus leading to
cost savings through increased economies of scale.
It is well known in business that an asymmetry of information exists in
the market135. Corporations accordingly seek to differentiate themselves from
competitors by sending signals to consumers136. These cost millions and are
economically sound decisions. Advertising, celebrity product support,
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guarantees, warranties137, certifications138 and CCCs are examples of such
signals. CCCs provide consumers with much needed information and enable
them to differentiate lower-level products from higher-level products139. A
fortiori, consumers faced with two products of equal quality will purchase the
one whose manufacturer follows a better CCC in light of labor standards, inter
alia. Of course, the foregoing is contingent on consumers actually knowing
which company manufactures a particular product and knowing its labor policy.
This is generally not problematic as companies can brand and advertise their
products as «child or forced labor free» or «generous wages paid to laborers.»
In fact, Freeman provides evidence in his study, where «… product labeling as
a strategy to improve working conditions for foreign workers»140 has worked
quite well. 
v. Increased responsiveness
A company’s power is predicated on consumer support. The ability to
earn revenues is materially reduced if it loses this by way of a long-term boycott
or reduction in sales141.  CCCs have the potential of initiating social change to
a certain degree and under specific conditions, as they enhance responsiveness
to consumer wishes and consequently have the potential for profit maximization.
Corporate behavior can be altered far more quickly through CCCs than
traditional forms of regulation. The effectiveness of these codes is dependent on
how they procure the attentiveness of corporate actors, whether it is for fear or
in response to public pressure. CCCs are most effective when corporations
dedicate extensive time to such exogenous considerations. 
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vi. Potential State assistance?
ILRs would be promoted if States provided financial incentives for
MNCs to draft and duly enforce CCCs, which would push corporations to adopt
these. Obviously, this issue represents the same dichotomy between MDCs and
LDCs as we saw in the aforementioned ILO and WTO contexts. The former
States will be more open to do so than the latter because of their respective
economic positions. State assistance therefore seems unlikely from LDCs.
The credibility of a CCC depends on two things. On the one hand, how
the code is drafted and interpreted and on the other hand, its monitoring and
enforcement mechanisms142.
vii. Drafting and Interpretation
As has already been mentioned, there is no standard-form CCC since it
must address a corporation’s specificities. One question worth asking is whether
«… the code [is] a genuine attempt to change corporate behavior or is it simply
a public relations exercise»143. It is helpful to look at whether the company
unilaterally adopted the CCC, or whether it was negotiated with NGOs or unions
in a bargaining process of quid pro quo144.
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viii. Monitoring and Enforcement
This is the main criticism of CCCs, and International Law as a whole.
Corporations may have drafted a superb code that is on the vanguard of labor
right protection in a specific industry, but really means nothing at all because it
is not duly enforced or monitored145. Workers must have reporting mechanisms
readily available against the corporation, presumably through some kind of
independent monitor. This person must not be a government official, for fear of
collusion between State governments and corporations. Even if an independent
monitor is named, the question arises who will monitor the monitors? This
thorny issue directly relates to the dichotomy between norm setting and
enforcement. For any effective regime, procedural assurances are required and
critics argue that these are ultimately ineffective for CCCs. This kind of
monitoring will only be effective if the monitor is independent both from the
corporation and those who adjudicate the code.
Monitoring mechanisms must include : «… training and incentives
encouraging managers to comply (e.g. performance bonuses); … sanctions on
those who do not comply»146; some form of objective auditable standards with
very precise and circumscribed objectives; verifications that an adequate
monitoring system exists147. An OECD study concluded that corporations
seldom deal with enforcement issues, «… and of those that did so, almost all
stated that in house staff would monitor compliance»148. Moreover, CCCs rarely
have material sanctions. The study concluded that the few CCCs that did
mention sanctions referred to «… working with suppliers or business partners
to make improvements»149. CCCs as they stand today are therefore substantively
toothless due to lax monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. This has striking
semblance to the ILO’s criticisms, particularly because CCCs are often well
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drafted. 
ix. Miscellaneous criticisms
Certain critics argue that CCCs are transitory commitments addressing
the flavor of the month, so to speak.  Moreover, democratic concerns arise
where corporations are consumer regulated as opposed to regulation founded on
demos and kratos. But as was previously mentioned, CCCs render jurisdictional
distinctions trite and domestic legislation has until now had minimal success to
regulate corporate activity. Furthermore, certain corporations within a specific
jurisdiction may be regulated by CCCs where as others will not. This
checkerboard regulatory framework may in principle lead to a race to the
bottom. Legislation, conventions and public pressure fortunately protect against
this. It cannot be emphasized enough that CCCs cannot exist by themselves. The
transnational character of CCCs may at times constitute liabilities because they
are produced in a certain State and applied throughout the world. It is often
argued that CCCs «… tend to export the American conceptions of corporate
social responsibility»150. This further adds to a checkerboard regulatory
framework where uniquely Western values are perpetuated, thus further
exacerbating north-south and east-west conflicts. However, certain values,
including CLS, are deemed universal and must be respected, independent of
such distinctions.
x. Viability of Solution
As we saw, CCCs lack enforcement mechanisms like most aspects of
International Law. It was nonetheless demonstrated that they have numerous
advantages that simply cannot be neglected. The ILO similarly has no coercive
component in the strict sense, yet most experts agree that it has nonetheless
substantially bettered the status of ILRs over its 95 year existence, without
applying over-exacting standards. This paper argues that CCCs must be viewed
in the same manner. It is true that the CCC is a form of soft-regulation, but its
international effects are manifest. Accordingly, International Law is the forum
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in which a solution must be devised and legitimacy and enforcement difficulties
are at the core of this debate. To say that CCCs are intrinsically illegitimate is
to place the entire state of International Law, with all its achievement, into
disrepute. They present a feasible interim solution because they are well adapted
to contemporary economic conditions. Clearly some MNCs will follow them
and others will not. Although exploitive corporate practices are frustrating, the
aim of CCCs as a regulatory instrument must be to better the status of ILRs in
general, despite non-compliance setbacks from many MNCs. Again, the ILO
functions on this premise and has achieved many accolades. 
Ultimately, consumers control MNCs and must be made aware of their
practices. NGOs are extremely important in this regard. They generate
information that enters the «marketplace of ideas»151 which creates public
awareness and enables consumers to take enlightened decisions. A company is
only as strong as its consumer base and CCCs present looming threats over
MNCs. Freeman «… argues that a market failure exists if western consumers
have a private disutility for consuming goods produced under poor or dangerous
working conditions. Such a market failure can be remedied if consumers are
offered the opportunity to pay a premium for goods produced in a safer and
more tolerable work environment»152. Prevention is fundamental, as opposed to
addressing ex post unsalvageable business cataclysms. NGOs must press MNCs
for «[c]onsumer product labels [which] provide an appealing method to allow
consumers to express their preference for and to pay for tolerable working
conditions»153.
CONCLUSION
Labor standards are not yet within the purview of the WTO, and will
likely not be except perhaps in the very long-term. Simply put, trade sanctions
for CLS violations equate to protectionism and the bifurcation between MDCs
and LDCs will grow, with nothing to close this rift. States adopt their economic
policies because their particular positions so dictate and would diametrically
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alter them in the eventuality that their economic positions changed significantly.
This is unadulterated pragmatism, which really reflects the complexity of ITL;
States often say not what they mean. MDCs and LDCs wish to do their best with
the cards they are dealt, so to speak, and respectively being proponents and
opponents of CLS achieves these ends.
Despite the fact that WTO rules do not currently regulate CLS,  «…
some WTO member governments in Europe and North America believe that the
issue must be taken up by the WTO in some form if public confidence in the
WTO and the global trading system is to be strengthened»154. Presumably,
having rights within the WTO’s ambit would ameliorate CLS and varied SLS
worldwide. Certain WTO member-States have suggested and continue to
suggest that a task force study the relationship between CLS and trade. This
proposal is contentious and has been rejected several times155. The WTO is not
intrinsically well positioned to enforce CLS. «[T]he denial of market access on
the basis of allegations of social dumping would be extremely difficult to apply
because the GATT requires that any restriction be applied in a manner that
would not constitute arbitrary or unjustified discrimination»156. There must
similarly be proportionality between measures used to restrict trade and the end
to be achieved157. Most LDCs currently assert that denying market access for
failure to respect CLS cannot pass these tests. 
The ILO is not capable of protecting and enforcing ILRs by itself. Its
conventions have undoubtedly bettered the protection of CLS, but this has been
more on a voluntary basis than anything else, notwithstanding convention
ratifications. Many States ratify conventions because of political opportunism,
but are truly mala fides in their intentions. Similarly, domestic legislation is a
barrier to certain activities of MNCs, yet is ultimately negligible in the vast
horizon of things. Labor standards do not exist in a vacuum. «Many developing
countries do recognize the need for raising labor standards. Child labor in India
is a case in point. To begin with, poor parents love their children just as much
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as the rich ones. They send their children to work not out of wickedness but
sheer economic necessity»158. It is unfortunate that disparities in wealth exist, yet
poverty has been a problem since the first days of humanity.
Given the failures of ITL to protect ILRs, we see that States are poorly
positioned to properly regulate MNCs. George Ball once mentioned that they are
«… very old-fashioned idea[s] … badly adapted to our present world»159. On the
other hand, MNCs are «… modern concept[s], designed to meet modern
requirements»160. Something new and different is necessary to address this
peculiar but inevitable reality, and CCCs present a viable interim solution; until
a substantive WTO agreement in concluded.
The advantage of CCCs is that they are as flexible, transnational and as
international as a corporation may be. They are highly targeted regulatory
instruments aimed at a specific corporation and not States themselves, which is
trade promoting. CCCs are obviously problematic in certain regards, most
notably in terms of enforcement. Despite the fact that numerous MNCs may not
enforce what they say, CLS will nevertheless be materially advanced by those
that do follow their CCCs. Consumer pressure is extremely important to keep
MNCs in check, as are IGOs and NGOs, inter alia.
Michael Moore, WTO Secretary-General once stated that «[i]nstitutions
like the WTO are owned by sovereign governments. We don’t tell governments
what to do. They tell us what to do»161. Accordingly, CLS can be protected only
with sufficient political will, which is obviously not the current case. Any
attempt to protect CLS is seen as disguised protectionism, as can be seen in the
Tuna and Shrimp Turtles cases. The WTO and CCCs need not be mutually
exclusive however, and interaction can take place between the two. This would
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be salutary but is contemporarily illusory. However, Rodrik notes that «[f]ree
trade among countries with very different domestic practices requires either a
willingness to countenance the erosion of domestic structures or the acceptance
of a certain degree of harmonization (convergence)»162. Different ways of
thinking may very well lead to a WTO agreement after all, however improbable
this may seem today. We can only hope for the sake of human rights.
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